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Abstract
We address a critical yet largely unsolved anomaly detection problem, in which we
aim to learn detection models from a small set of partially labeled anomalies and a
large-scale unlabeled dataset. This is a common scenario in many important appli-
cations. Existing related methods either proceed unsupervised with the unlabeled
data, or exclusively fit the limited anomaly examples that often do not span the en-
tire set of anomalies. We propose here instead a deep reinforcement-learning-based
approach that actively seeks novel classes of anomaly that lie beyond the scope of
the labeled training data. This approach learns to balance exploiting its existing
data model against exploring for new classes of anomaly. It is thus able to exploit
the labeled anomaly data to improve detection accuracy, without limiting the set of
anomalies sought to those given anomaly examples. This is of significant practical
benefit, as anomalies are inevitably unpredictable in form and often expensive to
miss. Extensive experiments on 48 real-world datasets show that our approach
significantly outperforms five state-of-the-art competing methods.
1 Introduction
Anomaly detection finds application in a broad range of critical domains, such as intrusion detection
in cybersecurity, early detection of disease in healthcare, and fraud detection in finance. Anomalies
often exhibit diverse causes, which results in different types/classes of anomalies having distinctly
heterogeneous features. For example, different types of network attack can embody entirely dissimilar
underlying behaviors. By definition, anomalies also occur rarely, and unpredictably, in a dataset. It is
therefore difficult, if not impossible, to obtain training data that covers all possible classes of anomaly.
This renders supervised methods impractical. Unsupervised approaches have dominated in this area
for decades for this reason [1, 2]. In many important applications, however, there exist a small set
of known instances of important classes of anomalies. These labeled anomalies provide valuable
prior knowledge, enabling significant accuracy improvements over unsupervised methods [3–7]. The
challenge then is how to exploit those limited labeled anomaly examples without assuming that they
illustrate every class of anomaly.
In most anomaly detection scenarios the volume of unlabeled data available is far more than could
practically be processed. This unlabeled dataset is often arbitrarily truncated as a result. The approach
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proposed here, however, is that we should actively select the unlabeled data that best informs our
model. This inevitably involves a compromise between exploring the data for new classes on anomaly,
or exploiting the existing data model to better detect the anomaly classes already identified.
In this work we consider the problem of anomaly detection with partially labeled anomaly data, i.e.,
large-scale unlabeled data and a small set of labeled anomalies that only partially cover the classes of
anomaly. Unsupervised anomaly detection approaches [4, 8–11] can often detect diverse anomalies
because they are not limited by any labeled data, but they can produce many false positives due to
the lack of prior knowledge of true anomalies. A few recently emerged semi-supervised approaches
[6, 7, 12] aim to utilize those labeled data, but their models are exclusively fitted to the limited
labeled anomalies, ignoring the supervisory signals from the possible anomalies in the unlabeled
data. A straightforward solution to this issue is to use current unsupervised methods to detect some
pseudo anomalies from the unlabeled data [4, 5], and then feed these pseudo anomalies and the
labeled anomalies to learn more generalized abnormality using advanced detection models, e.g., those
in [6, 7, 12]. However, the pseudo labeling can have many false positives due to the limitation of
unsupervised methods, leading to ineffective exploration and deteriorated exploitation; moreover, the
labeling and the detection modeling are two decoupled steps, failing to jointly optimize the two steps.
To address the problem, this paper proposes an anomaly detection-oriented deep reinforcement
learning (DRL) approach that actively seeks and learns novel classes of anomaly that lie beyond the
scope of the labeled anomaly data. Particularly, a neural network-enabled anomaly detection agent
is devised to exploit the labeled anomaly data to improve detection accuracy, without limiting the
set of anomalies sought to those given anomaly examples. The agent achieves this by interacting
with an environment created from the training data. Most real-world anomaly detection applications
involve no sequential decision process (e.g., tabular data), and thus, cannot provide the interactive
environment. An anomaly-biased simulation environment is created to enable the agent to effectively
exploit the small set of labeled anomalies while being deliberately explore the large-scale unlabeled
data for any possible anomalies that lie outside the scope of this set. We further define a reward
function using a synthesis of supervisory signals from both the labeled and suspicious unlabeled
anomalies to achieve a balanced exploration-exploitation.
Contributions. In summary, this work makes the following two major contributions. (i) We introduce
a novel DRL approach specifically designed for anomaly detection with partially labeled anomaly
data. The resulting DRL agent is able to actively explore rare and novel unlabeled anomalies to
learn abnormality beyond the scope of the given anomaly examples; its anomaly detection-oriented
exploration and exploitation are jointly optimized through the agent-environment interactions. (ii) We
instantiate the proposed framework into a detection model called DPLAN. The model is extensively
evaluated on 48 datasets generated from four real-world datasets to replicate scenarios with known
anomaly classes of different coverage. The results show that our model performs significantly better
and more stably than five state-of-the-art semi-supervised and unsupervised methods, achieving
respective 5%-8% and 34% absolute improvement in precision-recall rates.
2 Related Work
Anomaly Detection. Most conventional approaches [1, 8–10] are unsupervised without using any
labeled data, but they are often ineffective when handling high-dimensional and/or intricate data.
Recently deep learning has been explored to enhance the unsupervised detection, e.g., by using data
reconstruction [13–15], or learning feature representations tailored for specific anomaly measures
[4, 11, 16]. Some early exploration [4, 6, 7, 12] show that deep anomaly detection can be substantially
improved when some labeled anomalies are leveraged to guarantee a margin between the labeled
anomalies and normal instances. Prior to that, a few studies utilize those anomaly examples, e.g., by
label propagation [3] or clustering [5]. One shared issue is that their models can be overwhelmingly
dominated by the supervisory signals from the anomaly examples. There have been a number of
deep methods based on, e.g., adversarial training [17, 18], geometric feature transformation [19, 20],
one-class classification [21–24], or predictive modeling [25, 26], but they assume the availability of
large-scale labeled normal instances and thus address a different setting from ours (see [27] for a
comprehensive survey of deep anomaly detection methods).
Additionally, our problem appears to be similar to PU (positive-unlabeled) learning [28–31], but
they are two fundamentally different problems, because the positive instances (i.e., anomalies) in
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our problem lie in different manifolds or class structures, whereas PU learning assumes the positive
instances share the same manifold or class structure. Also, the exploration of unlabeled anomalies
is related to active anomaly detection [32–35]. However, active anomaly detection approaches ask
human experts to label a set of queried instances, and focus on devising cost-effective querying
methods to support the labeling; by contrast, our approach aims at automatically exploring the
unlabeled data, which is significantly more practical and applicable in real-world applications.
DRL for Knowledge Discovery. DRL has demonstrated human-level capability in several tasks,
such as Atari 2600 games [36], the game of Go [37] and StarCraft [38]. Motivated by those
tremendous success, DRL-driven real-world knowledge discovery emerges as a popular research area.
Some successful application examples are recommender systems [39, 40] and automatic machine
learning [41, 42]. A related application to anomaly detection is recently investigated in [43], in which
inverse reinforcement learning [44] is explored for sequential anomaly detection. Our work is very
different from [43] in that (i) they focus on unsupervised settings vs. our semi-supervised settings;
(ii) a sequential decision process is assumed in [43], largely limiting its applications, whereas our
approach does not have such assumptions; and (iii) they aim at learning an implicit reward function
whereas we aim at leveraging predefined reward functions to train anomaly detection agents.
3 The Proposed Approach
3.1 Problem Statement
Given a training dataset D = {Da,Du} (with Da ∩ Du = ∅), where Da consists of a
few labeled anomalies from a set of anomaly classes {C1, C2, · · · , Ck} while Du is an unla-
beled data set composed by normal instances and some anomalies drawn from a larger set of
anomaly classes {C1, C2, · · · , Ck, Ck+1, Ck+2, · · · , Ck+m}, including unknown anomaly classes
{Ck+1, Ck+2, · · · , Ck+m}, our goal is to learn an anomaly scoring function φ : D 7→ R that assigns
anomaly scores to data instances so that φ(si) > φ(sj), where si, sj ∈ RD are data instances from
D, si is an anomaly and sj is a normal instance.
3.2 Deep Reinforcement Learning Tailored for Anomaly Detection
Overview of Our Approach. We introduce an anomaly detection-oriented deep reinforcement
learning approach that actively explores the unlabeled data to learn abnormality beyond the scope of
the labeled anomalies. An overview of our framework is illustrated in Figure 1.
.
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Figure 1: The Proposed Anomaly Detection-oriented
Deep Reinforcement Learning Framework.
The framework aims to learn a neural network-
enabled anomaly detection agent A that selects an
optimal action out of two possible actions: a0 and
a1, respectively corresponding to labeling a given
observation1 s ∈ D as ‘normal’ and ‘anomalous’.
An anomaly-biased environment E is defined by
a composition of an external handcrafted reward
function h and an observation generator g to train
the agent. Specifically, at each time step t, the
agent A receives an observation st generated by
the observation generator g and takes action at,
and then receives an external reward re yielded
by the reward function h, which is handcrafted to
enforce the agent to correctly detect all labeled
anomalies in Da to maximize its cumulative future
reward. Additionally, an intrinsic reward function
f is defined to provide a reward ri based on the
novelty/abnormality of the observation st, which is devised to encourage unsupervised active ex-
ploration of Du for detecting possible unlabeled anomalies. The agent is iteratively trained in this
manner with a number of episodes, with each episode consisting of a fixed number of observations.
1The terms ‘observation’ and ‘instance’ are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
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During training, the rewards the agent receives are positively associated with the detection of
anomalies. Thus, at the inference stage, given a test observation sˆ, its abnormality can be directly
inferred based on the agent’s estimated value (i.e., the future rewards that can be expected) in taking
action a1 when observing sˆ.
The proposed framework is instantiated into an anomaly detection model called Deep Q-learning
with Partially Labeled ANomalies (DPLAN), which is introduced in detail as follows.
Anomaly Detection-oriented Agent. Our agent A aims to learn an optimal anomaly detection-
oriented action-value function (i.e., Q-value function), which can be approximated as:
Q∗(s, a) = max
pi
E[rt + γrt+1 + γ2rt+2 + · · · |st = s, at = a, pi], (1)
which is the maximum expected return starting from an observation s, taking the action a ∈ {a0, a1},
and thereafter following a behavior policy pi = P (a|s), with the return defined as the sum of rewards
rt discounted by a factor γ at each time step t. Different off-the-shelf DRL algorithms can be used to
learn Q∗(s, a). In this work, the well-known deep Q-network (DQN) [36] is used, which leverages
deep neural networks as the function approximator with the parameters θ: Q(s, a; θ) = Q∗(s, a) and
learns the parameters θ by iteratively minimizing the following loss:
Lj(θj) = E(s,a,r,s′)∼U(E)
[(
r + γmax
a′
Q(s′, a′; θ−j )−Q(s, a; θj)
)]
, (2)
where E is a set of the agent’s learning experience with each element stored as et = (st, at, rt, st+1);
the loss is calculated using minibatch samples drawn uniformly at random from the stored experience;
θj are the parameters of the Q-network at iteration j; the network with the parameters θ−j is treated
as a target network to compute the target at iteration j, having θ−j updated with θj every K steps.
Anomaly-biased Simulation Environment. We create a simulation environment E so that the agent
A can automatically interact with E to exploit Da while being actively explore Du.
Proximity-dependent Next Observation Sampling Function g. The sampling function g, a key module
in E, is composed by two functions, ga and gu, to empower a balanced exploitation and exploration
of the full data D. Particularly, ga is a function that uniformly samples st+1 from Da at random, i.e.,
st+1 ∼ U(Da), which offers the same chance for each labeled anomaly to be exploited by the agent.
gu is a function that samples st+1 from Du based on the proximity of the current observation. To
enable effective and efficient exploration of Du, gu is defined as
gu(st+1|st, at; θe) =

argmin
s∈S
d
(
st, s; θ
e
)
if at = a1
argmax
s∈S
d
(
st, s; θ
e
)
if at = a0,
(3)
where S ⊂ Du is a random subsample, θe are the parameters of ψ(·; θe) which is a feature embedding
function derived from the last hidden layer of our DQN, and d returns a Euclidean distance between
ψ(st; θ
e) and ψ(s; θe) to capture the distance perceived by the agent in its embedding space.
Both of ga and gu are used in our simulator: with probability p the simulator performs ga, and with
probability 1− p the simulator performs gu. This way enables the agent to sufficiently exploit the
small labeled anomaly data while exploring the large unlabeled data. In this work p = 0.5 is used to
balance the exploration-exploitation.
In Eq. (3), gu returns the nearest neighbor of st when the agent believes the current observation st is
an anomaly and takes action a1. This way allows the agent to explore observations that are similar
to the suspicious anomaly observations. gu returns the farthest neighbor of st when A believes st
is a normal observation and takes action a0, in which case the agent explores potential anomaly
observations that are far away from the normal observation. Thus, both cases are served for effective
active exploration of the possible anomalies in the large Du.
The parameters θe are a subset of the parameters θ in DQN. The nearest and farthest neighbors are
approximated on subsample S rather than Du for efficiency consideration, and we found empirically
that the approximation is as effective as performing gu on the full Du. |S| = 1000 is set by default.
S and θe are constantly updated to compute d for each step.
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Anomaly-biased External Handcrafted Reward Function h. The below h function is defined in the
environment simulator to yield a handcrafted reward signal ret to our agent:
ret = h(st, at) =

1 if at = a1 and st ∈ Da
0 if at = a0 and st ∈ Du
−1 otherwise.
(4)
It indicates that the agent receives a positive re only when it correctly labels the known anomalies as
‘anomalous’. Thus, re explicitly encourages the agent to fully exploit the labeled data Da.
Overall Reward. In addition to the external reward re yielded in Eq. (4), we introduce an intrinsic
reward ri measured by the novelty/abnormality of an observation in an unsupervised way, a.k.a. the
agent’s curiosity [45, 46]. Unlike re that encourages the exploitation of the labeled data Da, ri is
devised to encourage the agent to explore anomalies in the unlabeled data Du and defined as
rit = f(st; θ
e) = iForest
(
st; θ
e
)
, (5)
where f measures the abnormality of st using the well-known isolation-based unsupervised anomaly
detector, iForest [8]. Isolation is defined by the number of steps required to isolate an observation
s from the observations in Du through half-space data partition. iForest is used here because it is
computationally efficient and excels at identifying rare and heterogeneous anomalies.
Similar to gu in Eq. (3), the f function also operates on the low-dimensional ψ embedding space
parameterized by θe. That means both the training and inference in iForest are performed using the
ψ-based projected data. This enables us to capture the abnormality that is faithful w.r.t. our agent.
This also guarantees iForest always works on low-dimensional space as it fails to work effectively in
high-dimensional space [8]. The output of iForest is rescaled into the range [0, 1], we accordingly
have ri ∈ [0, 1], with larger ri indicating more abnormal. Thus, regardless of the action taken, our
agent would receive large ri whenever the agent believes the observation is rare or novel compared to
previously seen observations. This way helps the agent detect possible unlabeled anomalies in Du.
To balance the importance of exploration and exploitation, the overall reward the agent receives at
each time step t is defined as
rt = r
e
t + r
i
t. (6)
Anomaly Detection Using DPLAN. During training, the agent A in DPLAN is trained to minimize
the loss in Eq. (2) in an end-to-end fashion. Let Q(s, a; θ∗) be the Q-network with the learned θ∗
after training, then at the inference stage, Q(sˆ, a; θ∗) outputs an estimated value of taking action a0
or a1 given a test observation sˆ. Since a1 corresponds to the action of labeling sˆ as ‘anomalous’,
Q(sˆ, a1; θ∗) can be used as anomaly score. The intuition behind this scoring is discussed as follows.
Let pi be a policy derived fromQ, then the expected return of taking the action a1 given the observation
sˆ under the policy pi, denoted by qpi(sˆ, a1), can be defined as
qpi(sˆ, a
1) = Epi
[ ∞∑
n=0
γnrt+n+1
∣∣∣sˆ, a1]. (7)
Let sˆi, sˆj and sˆk be labeled anomalies, unlabeled anomalies and unlabeled normal observations re-
spectively, we would have h(sˆi, a1) > h(sˆj , a1) > h(sˆk, a1) and f(sˆi; θe) ≈ f(sˆj ; θe) > f(sˆi; θe).
Since rt in Eq. (7) is the sum of the outputs of the h and f functions, qpi(sˆi, a1) > qpi(sˆj , a1) >
qpi(sˆ
k, a1) holds under the same policy pi. Thus, when the agent well approximates the Q-value
function, its estimated returns would be: Q(sˆi, a1; θ∗) > Q(sˆj , a1; θ∗) > Q(sˆk, a1; θ∗); so the obser-
vations with large Q(sˆ, a1; θ∗) are anomalies of our interest. See Appendix A in the Supplementary
Material for detailed algorithmic description of DPLAN.
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets
Four widely-used real-world datasets that contain two-to-seven classes of (semantically) real anoma-
lies are used in our experiments. These include: NB15 [6, 47] that contains 107,687 data instances in
a 196-dimensional space from seven abnormal intrusion types and normal network flows, Thyroid
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[6–8, 48] that contains 7,049 instances in a 21-dimensional space from hypothyroid/subnormal and
normal thyroid patients, HAR [49, 50] that contains 7,707 instances in a 561-dimensional space
from anomalous walking-downstairs/upstairs sensor data against the other usual human activity data
(e.g., sitting, standing, laying), and Covertype [8, 48, 50–52] that contains 296,633 instances in a
54-dimensional space from anomalous cottonwood and douglas-fir forest cover types against the
common lodgepole pine. These four datasets serve as a base pool to create 48 datasets to evaluate the
performance of DPLAN in scenarios with known anomaly classes of different coverage.
Scenario I: One Known Anomaly Class. We split each of the NB15, Thyroid, HAR and Covertype
datasets into training and test sets, with 80% data of each class into the training data and the other
20% data into the test set. For the training data we retain only a few labeled anomalies to be Da,
and randomly sample anomalies from each anomaly class and mix them with the normal training
instances to produce the large anomaly-contaminated unlabeled data Du. We then create 13 datasets,
with each dataset having Da sampled from only one specific anomaly class; these datasets are shown
in Table 1, where each dataset is named by the known anomaly class. The test data is fixed after
the training-test data split, which contains one known and one-to-six unknown anomaly classes,
accounting for 0.96%-5.23% of the test data. See Appendix B for more details of the 13 datasets.
Since only a small number of labeled anomalies are available in many applications, in each dataset
the number of labeled anomalies is fixed to 60, accounting for 0.03%-1.07% training data only.
Anomalies are rare events, so the anomaly contamination rate in Du is fixed to 2%. Similar results
can be observed with other contamination rates (see Appendix D for detail).
Scenario II: Increasing Number of Known Anomaly Classes. We also examine the scenarios with
more known anomaly classes. This experiment focuses on the seven NB15 datasets in Table 1, since
it is inapplicable to Thyroid, HAR and Covertype that contain two anomaly classes only. Particularly,
each of these seven datasets is used as a base, and a new randomly selected anomaly class with 60
anomalies is incrementally added into its Da each step. This results in additional 35 datasets where
each training data contains two-to-six known anomaly classes. The test data remains unchanged.
4.2 Competing Methods and Performance Evaluation
DPLAN is compared with five state-of-the-art semi/un-supervised anomaly detectors below:
• DevNet [6] is a deep semi-supervised method that leverages a few labeled anomalies and a
Gaussian prior over anomaly scores to perform end-to-end anomaly detection.
• Deep SAD [7] is a deep semi-supervised method built upon the availability of a small
number of labeled normal and anomalous instances. Following [7, 53], Deep SAD is
adapted to our setting by enforcing a margin between the one-class center and the labeled
anomalies while minimizing the center-oriented hypersphere.
• REPEN [4] is a recent deep unsupervised detector that learns representations specifically
tailored for distance-based anomaly measures. Another popular deep unsupervised detector
DAGMM [11] is also tested, but it is less effective than REPEN. Thus we focus on REPEN.
• iForest [8] is a widely-used unsupervised method that detects anomalies based on how many
steps are required to isolate the instances by random half-space partition in isolation trees.
• DevNet+ is DevNet trained with the labeled anomaly set and some pseudo anomalies
identified in the unlabeled data. To have a straightforward comparison, DevNet+ uses the
same unlabeled anomaly explorer as DPLAN: iForest. iForest returns a ranking of data
instances only. A cutoff threshold, e.g., the top-ranked n% instances, is required to obtain
the pseudo anomalies. {0.01%, 0.05%, 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, 2%, 4%} are probed. We report
the best performance achieved using the threshold 0.05%.
A multilayer perceptron network is used in the Q-network since the experiments focus on tabular
data. All competing deep methods worked effectively using one hidden layer but failed to work using
a deeper network due to the limit of the small labeled data. To have a pair comparison, all deep
methods use one hidden layer with l units and the ReLU activation [54] by default. Following [4, 6],
l = 20 is used. DPLAN performs similarly well with other l settings (see Appendix E for detail). It
can also work effectively with deeper architectures (see ablation study in Section 4.4 for detail).
DPLAN is trained with 10 episodes by default, with each episode consisting of 2,000 steps. 10,000
warm-up steps are used. The target network in DQN is updated every K = 10, 000 steps. The other
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optimization settings of DPLAN are set to the default settings in the original DQN. DevNet and
REPEN are used with the settings respectively recommended in [4, 6]. Deep SAD uses the same
optimization settings as DevNet, which enable it to obtain the best performance. The isolation trees
with the same settings recommended in [8] are used in iForest, Eq. (5) in DPLAN and DevNet+. See
Appendix C for more details of implementing DPLAN and its five competing methods.
Two widely-used complementary performance metrics, Area Under Receiver Operating Characteristic
Curve (AUC-ROC) and Area Under Precision-Recall Curve (AUC-PR) [55], are used. All reported
results are averaged over 10 independent runs. The paired Wilcoxon signed rank [56] using AUC-ROC
(AUC-PR) across multiple datasets is used to examine the statistical significance of the results.
4.3 Comparison to State-of-the-art Methods
Scenario I. The comparison results on the 13 datasets with one known anomaly class are shown in
Table 1. DPLAN achieves the best performance on 10 datasets in both AUC-PR and AUC-ROC.
Particularly, in AUC-PR, on average, DPLAN outperforms the deep semi-supervised detectors
DevNet, Deep SAD and DevNet+ by 5%-8%, and both of the unsupervised anomaly detectors by
34%. DPLAN is also the best performer in AUC-ROC, outperforming all competing methods by
1%-10%. The improvement of DPLAN in AUC-PR over all counterparts is significant at the 99%
confidence level; the improvement in AUC-ROC is also significant at least at the 90% confidence
level. Furthermore, DPLAN performs very stably across all 13 datasets and has substantially smaller
AUC standard deviation than all five competing methods.
Table 1: AUC-PR and AUC-ROC Results (mean±std %) on 13 Real-world Datasets.
Data AUC-PR Performance AUC-ROC Performance
Base Dataset DPLAN DevNet DeepSAD REPEN iForest DevNet+ DPLAN DevNet DeepSAD REPEN iForest DevNet+
NB15
Analysis 68.3±0.8 64.0±3.3 59.5±3.6 44.7±0.8 37.8±2.2 60.9±1.0 85.2±0.4 83.9±5.2 76.9±1.9 81.0±1.9 73.8±1.8 84.7±1.0
Backdoor 70.0±0.4 70.2±3.4 67.8±5.7 38.9±0.7 37.1±2.5 71.3±0.4 83.5±0.6 79.5±6.1 75.3±4.9 80.4±1.5 73.6±2.1 80.7±0.9
DoS 68.1±0.2 71.8±2.2 69.0±2.8 36.5±1.1 37.9±2.7 75.1±1.1 80.9±0.5 84.6±2.4 77.9±3.0 75.7±1.8 73.7±2.4 87.1±1.1
Exploits 76.8±0.4 66.0±4.6 63.6±3.9 37.3±0.7 36.7±2.6 58.9±7.0 90.6±0.4 87.1±2.8 79.8±2.9 77.4±2.1 73.2±2.2 85.8±1.2
Fuzzers 64.6±0.8 49.3±2.8 49.9±5.8 36.1±0.6 37.1±2.5 50.0±5.4 87.8±0.2 84.1±0.4 83.9±1.0 76.7±1.5 73.5±1.9 85.6±1.5
Generic 75.9±0.4 74.8±3.9 70.3±1.3 48.5±0.7 38.0±2.6 64.7±2.1 82.7±0.7 82.0±3.2 79.3±2.6 85.4±0.7 73.7±2.0 82.8±1.4
Recon 43.8±0.9 38.6±0.4 39.2±0.5 45.7±0.8 37.4±2.4 41.4±1.4 80.9±0.8 81.9±0.2 82.1±0.3 80.9±1.4 73.5±1.2 82.9±0.5
Thyroid Hypothyroid 49.0±0.1 46.9±0.5 39.8±1.2 8.1±0.3 15.5±2.0 43.2±1.1 84.6±0.1 83.5±0.3 80.9±0.5 53.6±0.9 68.3±2.3 82.8±0.5Subnormal 43.6±0.7 37.9±3.1 30.8±3.5 7.9±0.2 18.4±2.8 28.8±3.2 82.1±0.1 78.4±0.8 75.8±0.5 52.3±0.9 73.3±2.3 80.0±0.9
HAR Downstairs 94.3±0.1 87.4±2.5 88.7±1.8 30.0±0.5 36.8±1.6 84.4±2.2 99.3±0.1 99.0±0.4 99.1±0.4 91.1±0.6 92.6±0.5 99.1±0.2Upstairs 94.2±0.5 86.5±0.9 88.7±0.8 29.7±0.4 39.4±1.9 90.0±1.1 99.6±0.1 98.3±0.9 99.0±0.1 91.8±0.6 94.0±0.4 99.4±0.1
Covertype Cottonwood 70.9±0.1 67.0±2.2 67.8±2.8 42.4±4.1 44.3±6.9 59.3±2.3 92.3±0.2 86.8±1.9 87.6±4.2 89.1±1.9 84.9±2.7 84.1±3.2Douglas-fir 77.6±0.3 72.2±1.9 72.8±1.4 45.3±2.1 45.6±7.5 66.9±1.1 97.6±0.0 97.4±0.3 97.3±0.2 90.1±1.0 86.2±2.8 96.3±0.2
Average 69.0±0.4 64.1±2.4 62.1±2.7 34.7±1.0 35.5±3.1 61.3±2.3 88.2±0.3 86.7±1.9 84.2±1.7 78.9±1.3 78.0±1.9 87.1±1.0
P-value - 0.0024 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0034 - 0.0254 0.0017 0.0010 0.0002 0.0769
Scenario II. The comparison results with increasing number of known anomaly classes are given in
Figure 2. REPEN and iForest are insensitive to the increased anomalies, so their results in Table 1 are
used as baselines. In general, increasing the coverage of known anomalies provide more supervision
information, which enables DPLAN, DevNet, Deep SAD and DevNet+ to achieve considerable
improvement, especially on datasets where the first known anomaly class cannot provide much
generalizable information, e.g., Fuzzers and Recon. The AUC-PR of DPLAN increases remarkably
from 43.8%-76.8% up to 82.6%-85.3% across the datasets, with maximal relative improvement as
large as more than 91%. Although DPLAN is less effective than, or entangled with, DevNet, Deep
SAD and DevNet+ at the starting point on some datasets such as Backdoor, DoS and Generic, it
evolves quickly and outperforms them by about 4%-6% in the end.
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Figure 2: AUC-PR Results w.r.t. the Number of Known Anomaly Classes.
DRL Exploration vs. Pseudo Anomaly Labeling. As shown in Table 1 and/or Figure 2, the pseudo
anomaly labeling in DevNet+ helps improve DevNet in a few datasets such as Backdoor, DoS,
Recon and Upstairs. However, it significantly degrades DevNet in many other datasets, especially
in AUC-PR, because the pseudo anomalies can contain many false positives, which deteriorate the
7
DevNet’s exploitation of the labeled anomalies. Although DPLAN and DevNet+ use exactly the
same unsupervised detector to explore the unlabeled data, the DRL exploration enables DPLAN to
have active data exploration and simultaneously balance the exploitation and exploration, achieving
substantially more effective exploration (see Section 4.4 for detail).
4.4 Analysis of DPLAN
Ablation Study. Below we analyze the contribution of three key components of DPLAN.
Anomaly-biased Simulation Environment. We compare DPLAN with its simplified variant, named
REnv, in which the anomaly-biased observation generator g is replaced with a Random Environment
(REnv), i.e., next observations are randomly sampled from D. As shown in Table 2, DPLAN
outperforms REnv by more than 22% and 13% in average AUC-PR and AUC-ROC respectively,
demonstrating the significant contribution of the anomaly-biased environment defined in DPLAN.
DRL Exploration. We also compare DPLAN with its variant, ERew, which is DPLAN with the
External Reward (ERew) only, i.e., no intrinsic reward. As shown in Table 2, DPLAN performs much
better than ERew in most cases, significantly outperforming ERew in AUC-ROC at the 90% confi-
dence level. This indicates that the isolation-based intrinsic reward-driven DRL exploration enables
DPLAN to explore the unlabeled data effectively, providing important complementary supervision
signals to the DPLAN’s exploitation of the labeled data. Nevertheless, the DRL Exploration inversely
affects the performance on two datasets Generic and Cottonwood, demonstrating the significant
challenges underlying the exploration of the rare and heterogeneous unlabeled anomalies.
Network Architecture. DQN+ is DPLAN using a deeper Q-network, with two additional hidden
layers with respective 500 and 100 ReLU units are added. Impressively, as shown in Table 2, DQN+
achieves remarkably improvement over DPLAN. This is encouraging because it indicates DPLAN
can learn more complex yet well generalized models from the limited labeled data, especially when
the amount of unlabeled data is large, e.g., the seven NB15 datasets and the two Covertype datasets,
whereas prior methods like DevNet drop significantly when using a deeper architecture [6].
Learning with More Training Steps. We further investigate the performance of DPLAN w.r.t. the
number of training steps. The results are given in Figure 3. It shows that the AUC-PR and episode
reward of DPLAN often converge very early, e.g., around 20,000 training steps. It is interesting
that through the 100,000 training steps, DPLAN is continuously enhanced on the Hypothyroid and
Subnormal datasets, achieving as large as further 23% and 98% AUC-PR improvement compared to
the version trained with 20,000 steps. This indicates that with larger training steps, DPLAN achieves
much better exploration on these two datasets. However, the opposite may occur on the three datasets
Fuzzers, Generic and Recon. DPLAN trained with 20,000 steps is generally recommended.
Table 2: DPLAN (Org) and Its Three Variants
AUC-PR Results (%) AUC-ROC Results (%)
Dataset Org ERew REnv DQN+Org ERew REnv DQN+
Analysis 68.3 66.1 67.4 77.6 85.2 85.4 79.5 91.1
Backdoor 70.0 68.0 67.7 82.0 83.5 76.9 77.6 92.1
DoS 68.1 67.6 69.6 75.8 80.9 77.9 80.6 91.7
Exploits 76.8 75.1 67.9 72.0 90.6 90.3 78.5 89.8
Fuzzers 64.6 63.7 69.7 68.6 87.8 86.7 80.8 88.7
Generic 75.9 77.9 64.3 72.9 82.7 86.9 73.7 83.2
Recon 43.8 44.6 66.5 54.0 80.9 78.7 76.6 87.9
Hypothyroid49.0 48.5 11.9 44.3 84.6 84.4 63.3 81.6
Subnormal 43.6 44.7 11.8 24.5 82.1 81.8 62.4 75.8
Downstairs 94.3 94.1 26.8 86.9 99.3 98.1 80.0 98.9
Upstairs 94.2 92.7 19.3 88.1 99.6 98.3 69.5 99.1
Cottonwood 70.9 72.2 36.7 70.0 92.3 93.9 80.7 93.7
Douglas-fir 77.6 76.5 30.0 75.2 97.6 97.5 74.7 97.5
Average 69.0 68.6 46.9 68.6 88.2 87.4 75.2 90.1
P-value - 0.449 0.022 1.000 - 0.090 0.001 0.281
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Figure 3: Results w.r.t. the Number of Training Steps
Computational Efficiency2. The time complexity of training DPLAN using stochastic optimization
is constant w.r.t. data size and is linear to the number of training steps. It takes averagely 621
seconds to train DPLAN with 20,000 steps for all the 13 datasets in Table 1, which is slower than
the competing methods which take 15-120 seconds. In practice the model training can be easily
taken offline. The online inference runtime is normally much more important. Similar to DevNet,
Deep SAD and DevNet+, DPLAN takes a single forward-pass to obtain the anomaly scores, so they
2All runtimes are calculated under the environment: Intel Core i7-8700 CPU @ 3.20GHz x 12, 16GB RAM.
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have similar inference complexity, e.g., they all takes two to three seconds to complete the anomaly
scoring of over 27,5000 test instances in total in all of the 13 datasets, which is much faster than
REPEN and iForest that respectively takes about 40 and 20 seconds.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposes an anomaly detection-oriented deep reinforcement learning approach. Our
approach can not only well exploit the limited labeled anomaly data, but also simultaneously ac-
tively explore the sparse and heterogeneous anomaly signals in the large unlabeled data, achieving
significantly more generalized abnormality than existing methods on 48 real-world datasets. This
also allows us to build more effective models with a deeper network architecture. Impressively, our
approach can achieve further 23%-98% relative AUC-PR improvement by only increasing the number
of training steps on some datasets. Its inference is also computationally efficient to scale. We are
exploring methods to automate our model for any individual datasets to release its full potential.
Broader Impact
Anomaly detection could be applied to a broad range of real-world applications, including detection of
network attacks/malware, credit card/insurance frauds, criminal activities, mechanical faults/defects,
abnormal patient symptoms, and many more [1, 2]. Our research focuses particularly on a common
scenario of these applications, in which partially labeled anomalies are available during training.
Learning from those labeled anomalies generally helps substantially improve the detection recall
rates and prevent many false-positive detection results, resulting in tremendous benefits, e.g., in
preventing crimes and undesired incidents in both the digital and physical worlds, better healthcare,
etc. Additionally, anomaly detection (and hence our work) could also be applicable to a range of other
relevant machine learning tasks, such as out-of-distribution example detection, adversarial example
detection, curiosity learning and open-set recognition.
By definition, anomaly detection aims at identifying rare data instances, so a potential major risk
of applying anomaly detection to real-world systems is the possible algorithmic bias against the
minority groups presented in the data, such as the under-represented groups in fraud detection and
crime detection systems [57, 58]. Our approach can mitigate some parts of this risk by informing
the model to detect the anomalies of our interest, rather than simply rare instances, by training the
model with some known anomaly examples. However, this risk may still exist in the exploration
of the unlabeled data in our model. It could be further mitigated by using our model together with
anomaly explanation algorithms [59, 60] that could provide practical explanation to why a specific
instance is identified as anomaly.
A The Algorithmic Details of DPLAN
The full procedure of training DPLAN is presented in Algorithm 1. The first three steps initialize
the size of the experience set and weight parameters of Q-value functions Q and Qˆ. DPLAN is
then trained with n_episodes episodes, with each episode having n_steps training steps. For each
episode, the first observation s1 ∼ U(Du) is uniformly sampled at random from the unlabeled data
Du. Then in Steps 7-8, we adopt the same -greedy exploration as in the original DQN, in which with
a probability of  the agent randomly selects an action from {a0, a1}, and otherwise selects the action
that maximizes the action-value function at the current time step. After the agent performing the
selected action, the environment responses to the agent with next observation st+1, with probability p
we randomly sample it from the labeled anomaly set Da, i.e., st+1 ∼ U(Da), and otherwise return
the nearest/farthest neighbor of st in a random subsample S ⊂ Du based on gu(st+1|st, at; θe),
where θe is a subset of parameters in θ and is constantly updated. The environment also gives a
reward ret to the agent. At the same time, f(st, θˆ
e) is used to yield an intrinsic reward rit. θˆ
e is
exactly the same set of parameters as θe. θˆe = θe is updated every N steps rather than every step.
Constantly updating θˆe = θe requires to frequently project data onto low-dimensional space and build
iForest, which adds remarkably extra computation. The overall reward the agent receives in each
time step is rt = ret + r
i
t. After that, we gain an experience record (st, at, rt, st+1) and store it into
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the experience set E . Steps 14-16 then perform the Q-learning update, with the target action-value
function Qˆ = Q updated every K steps.
Algorithm 1 Training DPLAN
Input: D = {Da,Du} - training data
Output: Q(s, a; θ∗) - action-value function (anomaly detection agent)
1: Initialize action-value function Q with random weights θ
2: Initialize target action-value function Qˆ with weights θ− = 0
3: Initialize the size of experience set E to M
4: for j = 1 to n_episodes do
5: Initial observation s1 ∼ U(Du)
6: for t = 1 to n_steps do
7: With probability  select a random action at from {a0, a1}
8: Otherwise select at = argmaxaQ(st, a; θ)
9: With probability p the environment returns st+1 ∼ U(Da)
10: Otherwise return st+1 ∼ Du based on gu(st+1|st, at; θe)
11: Calculate intrinsic reward rit = f(st, θˆe)
12: Receive reward rt = ret + rit
13: Store experience (st, at, rt, st+1) in E
14: Randomly sample a minibatch of experience records (sl, al, rl, sl+1) from E
15: Set yl =
{
rl if episode terminates at step l + 1
rl + γmaxa′ Qˆ(sl+1, a
′; θ−) otherwise
16: Perform a gradient descent step on
(
yl −Q(sl, al; θ)
)2 w.r.t. the weight parameters θ
17: Update θˆe = θe every N steps
18: Update Qˆ = Q every K steps
19: end for
20: end for
21: return Q
After training, DPLAN returns Q(s, a; θ∗), which is an approximated optimal action-value function
and can be seen as an anomaly detection agent to detect anomalies. The procedure of using DPLAN
to detect anomalies in a test set T is presented in Algorithm 2. Specifically, given every observation
sj ∈ T , DPLAN performs one forward-pass in its network and then gets the estimated action-value
for each action. If sj is believed to be an anomaly, DPLAN would select action a1 with a large action-
value, and select a0 with a small action-value otherwise. The observations with large action-value are
considered as anomalies.
Algorithm 2 Anomaly Detection using DPLAN
Input: T - test data, Q(s, a; θ∗) - anomaly detection agent
Output: y - anomaly scores
1: for j = 1 to |T | do
2: yj = argmaxaQ(s
j , a; θ∗), sj ∈ T
3: end for
4: return Anomaly scores y
B Datasets
Four widely-used real-world datasets that contain two-to-seven classes of (semantically) real anoma-
lies are used in our experiments, including NB15, Thyroid, HAR and Covertype. These four datasets
are publicly available and can be accessed via the links given in Table 3.
NB15 is a recently released network intrusion datasets with a range of network attacks. The seven
most common types of attacks, including analysis, backdoor, DoS, exploits, fuzzers, generic and
reconnaissance (recon for short), are used as anomalies against normal network flows.
Thyroid is a dataset for detection of thyroid diseases, in which patients diagnosed with hypothyroid
or subnormal are anomalies against normal patients.
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Table 3: Links for accessing the datasets
Data Link
NB15 https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/unsw-canberra-
cyber/cybersecurity/ADFA-NB15-Datasets/
Thyroid https://www.openml.org/d/40497
HAR https://www.openml.org/d/1478
Covertype https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/covertype
HAR contains embedded inertial sensor data from a waist-mounted smartphone for six different
human activities. The activities of walking downstairs and walking upstairs (downstairs and upstairs
for short) are treated as abnormal activities w.r.t. the other four common activities.
Covertype contains cartographic data of seven forest cover types. Following the literature [8, 48, 50],
the most dominant cover type lodgepole pine is used as the normal class against cottonwood and
douglas-fir that demonstrates obvious deviations from lodgepole pine.
One-hot encoding is used to convert all categorical features into numeric features. Missing values
are replaced with the mean value if there are any. All features are normalized into the range [0, 1]
before modeling. Anomalies, by definitions, are rare data instances. Thus, following the literature
[6, 8, 48, 50, 61], random downsampling without replacement is applied to the DoS, exploits,
fuzzers, generic, recon, downstairs and upstairs classes to guarantee the rarity nature of anomalies.
Specifically, we downsample the DoS, exploits, fuzzers, generic, recon anomaly classes to have 3,000
instances so that all anomaly classes in the NB15 data are of a similar size. This is to guarantee the
class balance among the anomaly classes to enable fair evaluation of the performance in detecting
anomalies from different anomaly classes. The downstairs and upstairs are downsampled so that the
anomalies from each of these classes account for 2% of the dataset. An overview of the key statistics
of the four data bases is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Key statistics of four data bases. D is the dimensionality. Each data base contains two-to-seven anomaly
classes.
Data Base Normal Class Anomaly Class
Data Name D Class Name Class Size Class Name Class Size (%)
NB15 196 normalnetwork flows 93,000
analysis 2,677 (2.80%)
backdoor 2,329 (2.44%)
DoS 3,000 (3.13%)
exploits 3,000 (3.13%)
fuzzers 3,000 (3.13%)
generic 3,000 (3.13%)
recon 3,000 (3.13%)
Thyroid 21 normalpatients 6,666
hypothyroid 166 (2.43%)
subnormal 368 (5.23%)
HAR 561 walking, sitting,standing, laying 7,349
downstairs 150 (2.00%)
upstairs 150 (2.00%)
Covertype 54 the largest class(lodgepole pine) 283,301
cottonwood 2,747 (0.96%)
douglas-fir 17,367 (5.78%)
To replicate the scenarios where we have some known anomaly examples in the training data and
test data contains both known and unknown anomaly classes, we use the above four datasets as a
base pool to further create 13 datasets, with each dataset containing one known anomaly class in
its training data. Specifically, we split each of the NB15, Thyroid, HAR and Covertype datasets into
training and test sets, with 80% data of each class into the training data and the other 20% data into
the test set. For the training data we retain only a few labeled anomalies to be Da, and randomly
sample anomalies from each anomaly class and mix them with the normal training instances to
produce the large anomaly-contaminated unlabeled data Du. We then create 13 datasets, with each
dataset having Da sampled from only one specific anomaly class; key statistics of these datasets are
shown in Table 5, where each dataset is named by the known anomaly class. The test data is fixed
after the training-test data split, which contains one known and one-to-six unknown anomaly classes.
The anomalies account for 0.96%-5.78% of the test data.
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Table 5: Key statistics of 13 datasets created from the four data bases: NB15, Thyroid, HAR and Covertype.
Data Base Dataset Data Size D Anomaly Class Normal Class Anomaly Proportion
NB15
Analysis 95,677 196 Analysis
Normal network flows
2.80%
Backdoor 95,329 196 Backdoor 2.44%
DoS 96,000 196 DoS 3.13%
Exploits 96,000 196 Exploits 3.13%
Fuzzers 96,000 196 Fuzzers 3.13%
Generic 96,000 196 Generic 3.13%
Recon 96,000 196 Recon 3.13%
Thyroid Hypothyroid 6,832 21 Hypothyroid Normal patients 2.43%Subnormal 7,034 21 Subnormal 5.23%
HAR Downstairs 7,499 561 Downstairs Common human activities(Classes 1, 4, 5, 6)
2.00%
Upstairs 7,499 561 Upstairs 2.00%
Covertype Cottonwood 286,048 54 Cottonwood Lodgepole Pine 0.96%Douglas-fir 300,668 54 Douglas-fir 5.78%
C Implementation Details
Algorithm Implementation. All methods are implemented using Python, with DevNet and REPEN
directly taken from the authors at https://sites.google.com/site/gspangsite/sourcecode and iForest
taken from the scikit-learn package. Deep anomaly detection methods DevNet, DevNet+, REPEN and
Deep SAD are built upon Keras with Tensorflow as the backend. We implement DPLAN based on the
deep Q-network implementation in the open-source Keras-based deep reinforcement learning project,
namely, Keras-rl, available at https://github.com/keras-rl/keras-rl. Our anomaly-biased simulation
environment is implemented under the OpenAI Gym environment. The main packages and their
versions used in this work are provided as follows:
• gym==0.12.5
• keras==2.3.1
• keras-rl==0.4.2
• numpy==1.16.2
• pandas==0.23.4
• scikit-learn==0.20.0
• scipy==1.1.0
• tensorboard==1.14.0
• tensorflow==1.14.0
Hyperparameter Settings. The network architecture used in DPLAN, DevNet, Deep SAD and
REPEN contains one hidden layer with 20 ReLU units by default. The DPLAN with a deeper network
architecture (i.e., the variant of DPLAN - DQN+) adds two additional hidden layers immediately
after the input layer. The first hidden layer contains 500 ReLU units while the second hidden layer
contains 100 ReLU. Following each of these two hidden layers, we add a dropout layer to avoid
overfitting. The dropout rate is 0.9 for both dropout layers.
Since original deep Q-network is designed for complex control tasks with a large set of possible actions
in very high-dimensional space, some of its recommended parameter settings are not applicable to
our anomaly detection task with two possible actions. Therefore, in addition to adapt the network
architecture, some parameters also need to be accordingly adapted. Specifically, DPLAN is trained
with 20,000 steps by default, with 10,000 warm-up steps and the target network updated every
10,000 steps. Each episode contains 2,000 steps. The episode is terminated only when the 2,000
steps are completed. We update the parameters θe in the intrinsic reward function f every episode
(i.e., 2,000 steps). Also, as shown in Algorithms 1 and 2, the  greedy exploration is only used in
our model training, with  annealed from 1.0 to 0.1 over the course of 10,000 steps; it is not used
in our evaluation since we does not need any further exploration during testing. The experience
replay memory size is set to 100,000 since our agent can typically converge very early. The other
parameters of deep Q-network are set to the default settings as in the original DQN [36], with some
key hyperparameter settings shown in Table 6.
DevNet, REPEN and iForest are used with the settings recommended in [4, 6, 8]. DevNet+ uses the
same optimization settings as DevNet. We searched the minibatch size for Deep SAD using a set of
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Table 6: Key default hyperparameters from original DQN
Hyperparameter Value
minibatch size 32
discount factor γ 0.99
learning rate 0.00025
gradient momentum 0.95
min squared gradient 0.01
options {8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512} and found the batch size 512 works best for Deep SAD. Deep
SAD generally converged after 50 epochs, with 20 minibatches per epoch. So, these settings are used
by default for Deep SAD.
D Tolerance w.r.t. Anomaly Contamination Rate
Experiment Settings. We also examine the effect of varying anomaly contamination rates on the
performance of the detectors. We incrementally add unlabeled anomalies into the training data with
an anomaly contamination factor of n× 2% for each anomaly class, with n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Results. The AUC-PR results of DPLAN and its five competing anomaly detectors w.r.t. increasing
anomaly contamination are shown in Figure 4. The following three remarks can be made from the
results. (i) Regardless of the difference in the anomaly contamination, the superiority of DPLAN over
the five competing methods is consistent to the results using 2% contamination in the main text. (ii) It
is interesting that DPLAN, DevNet and Deep SAD perform stably with increasing anomaly pollution
factors on several datasets, i.e., Analysis, DoS, Hypothyroid, Downstairs and Douglas-fir, while
having clear downward trends on the rest of the other datasets where the supervisory signal from the
the labeled anomalies may not be strong enough to tolerate the noises. (iii) REPEN and DevNet+
demonstrate very irregular performance patterns. This may be due to that both of them incorporate
a pseudo labeling module into its learning process, and their performance is rather sensitive to the
quality of the pseudo labels. For example, REPEN and DevNet+ may achieve substantially improved
performance when the true positives in the pseudo labels increase; and its performance may drop
badly in the opposite cases.
E Sensitivity w.r.t. Representation Dimensionality Size
Experiment Settings. We also examine the sensitivity of DPLAN w.r.t. varying representa-
tion dimensionality size in its feature layer. A set of dimensionality sizes in a large range, i.e.,
{10, 20, 40, 80, 160, 320}, is used.
Results. The AUC-PR results of DPLAN w.r.t. the representation dimensionality size on all the
13 datasets are shown in Figure 5. In general, DPLAN performs rather stably with different di-
mensionality sizes across the datasets. DPLAN performs less effectively using 10 representation
dimensions than using larger representation dimensions, because 10-dimensional representations
are not expressive enough to capture complex relations in most of the datasets. The performance of
DPLAN becomes stable using 20 representation dimensions; increasing the dimensionality size does
not change the performance much thereafter. This may be due to the fact that the supervisory informa-
tion that can be leveraged by DPLAN is bounded at some point; thus, increasing the dimensionality
of the learned representation space does not further improve the detection performance. In some
cases where more supervisory information can be leveraged for building more complex models, such
as on the dataset Subnormal, the performance of DPLAN is continuously improved with increasing
representation dimensionality. This is consistent to the results presented in Figure 3 in the main text.
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